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BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
Effect of Discharge
In each of three recent cases, a discharged bankrupt allowed
judgment to go against him by default and then sought to annul
the judgment or to enjoin its execution. In each case, the discharged bankrupt was denied relief.
Bordelon v. X-L Finance Co.1 presented the following sequence of events. On February 10, 1965, the debtor filed his petition in bankruptcy, listing in his schedule of liabilities a note held
by the defendant finance company, and on April 1, 1965, he
received a discharge in bankruptcy. On April 6, 1965, the finance
company sued on the note; thereafter, a default judgment was
entered and a writ of garnishment was served on the debtor's
employer. Action then was brought by the debtor to annul the
judgment and to enjoin its execution.
The district court granted the relief prayed for, mistakenly
relying upon Mabry v. Beneficial Finance Co.2 The Mabry case
was inapposite for the reason that the judgment there was
obtained before the debtor received his discharge, which evidently he could not assert until the creditor attempted, after
discharge, to garnish the debtor's wages. The court of appeal,
in reversing the district court, correctly held that where judgment was obtained after discharge, it was improper to annul
the judgment.
Investment Contracts,Inc. v. Jones3 also involved an attempt
to annul a default judgment. On July 6, 1967, the creditor
brought an action on a note which was secured by a chattel
mortgage on furniture. The debtors became bankrupt on the
same day and received their discharge on September 15, 1967.
Default judgment for the creditor was confirmed on January
31, 1968, and garnishment followed. In seeking to annul the
judgment as one obtained by fraud,4 the debtors claimed that
the creditor's attorney notified them by letter that the trustee
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. 227 So.2d 654 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
2. 215 So.2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).

See The Work of the Loutsiana

Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Bankruptcy, 30 LA. L. Rsv. 267
(1969).
3. 230 So.2d 262 (La

App. 1st Cir. 1969).

4. LA. CoDi Civ. P. art. 2004.
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in bankruptcy had disclaimed all interest in the mortgaged furniture and that the creditor was offering them a choice of
keeping the furniture and paying the debt or relinquishing the
furniture and being relieved of the debt, to which the debtors'
attorney replied in writing that the creditor should pick up the
furniture as the debtors were unable to pay. According to the
creditor's evidence, much of the mortgaged furniture could not be
found; the rest was in such bad condition that the creditor refused to receive it. The trial court concluded that the creditor was
not guilty of fraud in proceeding with its action on the note, and
the court of appeal declined to disturb this evaluation of the
evidence. Regardless of any possible fraud, it plainly was the
duty of the debtors to plead their discharge in bankruptcy as
an affirmative defense 5 to the action on the note, and having
failed to do so, they were not entitled to relief.
In O'Neill v. D. H. Holmes Co.6 the debtor, who had listed
in his schedule of liabilities the claim owed to the creditor,
received his discharge in bankruptcy in November, 1967. A
default judgment for the creditor was confirmed on September
20, 1968, and the creditor proceeded to garnishment in execution of the judgment. The debtor brought suit to enjoin garnishment of his wages, and prevailed in the trial court. He cited
Mabry v. Beneficial Finance Co.7 and LouisianaMachinery Co. v.
Passman,' but, as the court of appeal said: "In both of these
cases the judgments were rendered before the defendants were
discharged. Consequently, the defense of discharge in bankruptcy
was not available for either defendant to plead prior to rendition of judgment ....

Here, the judgment against the bankrupt

was rendered almost one year subsequent to the bankrupt's
discharge."'
The debtor further contended that article 1005 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which lists discharge in bankruptcy among
the affirmative defenses that must be set forth in the answer,
frustrates the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, to which it must
yield under Article VI of the United States Constitution-the
Supremacy Clause. This contention was plainly without merit.
"The effect of a discharge upon a claim that is dischargeable
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
232
215
158
232

art. 1005.
So.2d 849
So.2d 192
So.2d 419
So.2d 849,

(La. App. 4th ir. 1970).
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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is to afford a valid defense to the prosecution of the claim to
judgment, or the satisfaction of the judgment if the claim has
gone to judgment. The discharge is not a payment or extinguishment of the debt; it is simply a bar to all future legal proceedings
for the enforcement of the discharged debt."10
Owing to the enactment of Public Law 467 of the 91st
Congress, which took effect sixty days after its approval by the
President on October 19, 1970, the problem of the preceding
three cases should no longer arise. Among other changes, this
latest amendment to the Bankruptcy Act empowers courts of
bankruptcy to determine the dischargeability of any debt; to
render judgment for a nondischargeable debt and order enforcement of the judgment; to nullify any judgment as a determination of personal liability on a discharged debt; and to enjoin
creditors from suing on, or using any process to collect, a discharged debt.
Debts Unaffected by Discharge
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act specifies debts not affected
by a discharge. Section 17 begins: "A discharge in bankruptcy
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
except. ..
Resolute InsuranceCo. v. Underwood12 involved a subrogation
action for property damage caused by defendant's negligence.
Defendant admitted his negligence but pleaded discharge in
bankruptcy as an affirmative defense. The trial court concluded
that the claim, being one not provable in bankruptcy, was
unaffected by the discharge, and gave judgment for plaintiff.
The court of appeal affirmed.
Claims arising in tort are ordinarily not provable in bankruptcy.a Section 63a14 lists debts that may be proved. Among
these are: "(1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment
or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition ...

; (4) an open account, or a contract

express or implied... ; (7) the right to recover damages in any
10. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.27 (1969).

11. 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1964).
12. 230 So.2d 483 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 255 Ia. 809, 238
So.2d 249 (1970).

13. SA W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 63.25 (1969).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 103a (1964).
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action for negligence instituted prior to and pending at the
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy ...."
As no judgment was obtained in this case before bankruptcy,
section 63a(1) did not apply. As no action for negligence was
instituted prior to bankruptcy, section 63a(7) did not apply.
Defendant, however, relied on section 63a(4), and on section
63a(8) which refers to "contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities," but neither provision was helpful. There
was no unjust enrichment, hence no implied contract, for "where
the enrichment is zero, there is no provable claim."'15 The phrase
"contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities," though
not without ambiguity, has been said to "embrace every type
of claim otherwise provable under § 63: clause (8) was not
intended to broaden or restrict the type of provable claim; it
was merely intended to eliminate any restriction of fixed
liability."'8 Plaintiff's claim was not provable, and discharge in
bankruptcy was not a good defense.
Section 17a (2) provides in part:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts, . . .except such as . . . (2) are

liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit
in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing
respecting his financial condition made or published or
caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever
with intent to deceive. .

...17

Where a creditor brings an action after bankruptcy on a
properly scheduled claim, and the debtor pleads his discharge,
the creditor must show: "(1) that defendant made false representations; (2) that these representations were made with the
intention of defrauding the plaintiff; and (3) that the plaintiff
relied upon and was misled by the false pretenses or representations." 8
In one such recent action, the creditor prevailed.' 9 In an15. 3A W. Coi R,

BANKRUPTCY § 63.25 (1969).
16. Id. § 63.30.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 35a (2) (1964).
18. DeLatour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir.

1930). These requirements have been repeated in scores of cases.
19. North Am. Fin. Corp. v. Ketchum, 223 So.2d 697 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969).
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other case, the proof did not show a materially false statement
in writing. 20 In two other cases, reliance by the plaintiff was not
21

proved.

Section 17a (2) provides further:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts, . .. . except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities ... for willful and malicious injuries to the person

or property of another ...

"

In Mid-South Finance & Thrift, Inc. v. Cupit22 action was
brought on a note. Defendant, who had listed the note in his
schedule of liabilities, pleaded discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiff
sought to bring its claim within section 17a (2) by asserting that
defendant had willfully and wrongfully disposed of certain movables covered by a chattel mortgage that secured the note.
It is clear that "a wrongful act done intentionally, which
necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse,
may constitute a willful and malicious injury. .

.

. Thus the

conversion of another's property without his knowledge or consent, done intentionally and without justification or excuse, to
another's injury, is a willful and malicious injury within the
meaning of the exception. '28 And it has been held that a debt
will not be discharged where property mortgaged to secure the
indebtedness has been wrongfully disposed of, concealed, or
removed by the debtor.2 4 In the Cupit case, however, plaintiff
bought the mortgaged property from the trustee in bankruptcy
after its manager had identified at defendant's house each item
covered by the mortgage. Defendant and his wife soon moved to
another city, leaving the property in the house and notifying
plaintiff where the property was and that it might be taken.
Defendant owed no duty to keep plaintiff's property safe; his
only duty was to give plaintiff notice as he had done. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the lender's action was
affirmed.
20. Great S. Mtge. & Loan Corp. v. Dillon, 230 So.2d 901 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970).
21. First Nat'l Bank v. Leblanc, 234 So.2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970);
Sales Purchase Corp. v. Barnes, 228 So.2d 155 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 255 La. 276, 230 So.2d 586 (1970).
22. 225 So.2d 125 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
23. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

§ 17.17[1]

(1969).

24. X-L Fin. Co. v. Adams, 187 So.2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); Excel
Fin. Camp, Inc. v. Tannerhill, 140 So.2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also
LA. R.S. 9:5359 (Supp. 1970).
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Promise to Pay Discharged Debt
Though the Bankruptcy Act does not refer to revival of debts,
a new promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy is generally actionable without new consideration as a matter of state
5 The promise may be made at
law. 25 This is true in Louisiana.2
any time after filing of the petition in bankruptcy,27 but it must
be "definite, express, distinct, and unambiguous."' 2 An expression
that does not amount to a clear and unequivocal promise to pay
is not sufficient.2
The court in Beneficial Finance Co. v. Lalumia8 held that,
in the absence of a new promise, the making of payments on a
note after the debtor had filed his petition in bankruptcy did
not revive liability on the discharged debt or create a new enforceable obligation. This is the uniform result.81 Giving a new
note for a debt discharged in bankruptcy does, however, amount
to a new promise that creates an enforceable obligation, as Booty
v. American Finance Corp.82 recognized.88
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
Divorce Jurisdiction
The decision in Self v. Self' violates the due process clause
by denying to a person the application of the only state's law
which is applicable to him in the only state which can hear his
suit. In so doing it also violates indirectly the full faith and
credit and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff and his wife were separated from bed and board
while domiciled in Louisiana. Subsequently the wife moved her
25. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.33 (1969).
26. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So.2d 485 (1945), refers to LA.
Civ. CODE arts. 1757, 1759, and states: "The law on this subject is the same
in Louisiana as it is in the other states." Id. at 484, 21 So.2d at 488.
27. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.36 (1969).
28. Id. § 17.34.
29. Securities Fin. Co. v. Marbury, 180 So.2d 737 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
80. 223 So.2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
31. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.37 (1969).
32. 224 So.2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969). The issue arose on a reconventional demand in the debtor's action for damages for invasion of privacy.
33. See Dinger v. Rothery, 10 N.J. Misc. 938, 161 A. 645 (1932).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 So.2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).

